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Abstract
We investigate the impact of revolving door on public procurement outcomes, combining
10 years of Brazilian health procurement data with a comprehensive employer-employee
dataset tracking individuals’ job trajectories. We identify how movements between pub-
lic administrations and private providers affect total contracting amounts and acquisition
prices. Analyzing career changes in both directions, we uncover positive and negative
effects, consistent respectively with reward for high-skill workers’ competence, and collu-
sive behavior. Administration-to-supplier movements appear beneficial to public bodies,
while supplier-to-administration ones are detrimental. This points to unexpected policy
implications related to the tolerance of revolving door practices.
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1 Introduction
Revolving doors between public sector agencies and the private firms they deal with are
common in sectors such as insurance, banking, and lobbying.1 The existence of such personnel
movements raises a natural question: what are the potential social benefits and costs of
revolving doors?
There are polar views on the potential impact of public-to-private revolving door arrange-
ments. On the one hand, negligent or complacent behavior by officials may lead to suboptimal
effort and waste or, worse, to collusion and corruption (Eckert, 1981). On the other hand,
post-administration opportunities may be necessary to attract talents to the public sector.
This may be reinforced by the fact that zealous officials have incentives to accumulate and
display competence in order to boost their future employment perspectives (Che, 1995; Bar-
Isaac and Shapiro, 2011; Bond and Glode, 2014). Similarly, potential conflicting incentives
involving either collusion or increased efficiency may arise when considering private-to-public
movements. Given those contrasting theoretical predictions, the determination of revolving
door effects remains an open empirical matter.
This paper shows that revolving doors are pervasive in the public procurement sector,
and analyzes their impact by studying the link between public officials’ career path and
outcomes in the Brazilian public procurement process. This is a perfect testing ground,
thanks to the availability of high quality data on both public purchases and individual careers.
Using a dataset covering more than 2 million procurement contracts for standardized medical
supplies, hospital equipment, and pharmaceuticals organized by public bodies over 10 years,
together with a comprehensive employer-employee dataset tracking individual job experience
and characteristics of all public and private formal workers in the country, we systematically
identify career changes in two directions. Officials may work first for a public body and
then join a private supplier. Alternatively, officials can work first for a private supplier before
joining a public body. We investigate how these revolving door career paths affect procurement
outcomes: total amount of contracts and acquisition prices.
The empirical identification of revolving door effects is a challenging task. The analy-
sis of public procurement contracts has several advantages in that regard. First, given the
high degree of specific knowledge and expertise involved in procurement transactions, it is
natural to expect that workers move between administrations and firms, and we do see a
1See, for example, Blanes i Vidal, Draca, and Fons-Rosen (2012), Bertrand, Bombardini and Trebbi (2014),
Lucca, Seru and Trebbi (2014), the investigation on State-level health insurance regulation in the U.S. (Mishak,
2016), or the recent movements of high-ranking EU officials to or from the investment banking group Goldman
Sachs (former head of EU commission José Manuel Barroso moving to the bank, The Guardian, July 8, 2016;
Mario Draghi becoming head of the European Central Bank, NYT, June 24, 2011).
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large number of such movements. Second, standardized products are recurrently bought by
administrations and the outcomes of these transactions (acquisition price and quantities) are
comparable between firm-administration pairs and over time. Third, procurement involves
repeated relationships, and our long panel allows us to observe transactions in specific firm-
administration pairs both before and after specific revolving individuals appear on the payroll
of either of the partners. Fourth, uncovering effects of revolving doors is particularly impor-
tant in the context of public procurement, which involves large amounts of public money and
some discretionary decisions by public officials.
We estimate revolving door effects in a staggered difference-in-differences setting, with
different firm-administration pairs developing a revolving door connection at different times
throughout the period. We compare, for the same products, the changes in our outcome
variables within firm-administration pairs over time. That means that our effects are identified
out of pairs for which we observe both periods where the revolving door employees do not
work for either of the members, and periods in which these employees work for the public
entity and then for the firm (or conversely for the firm first, then for the public entity).
We first provide evidence that the needed parallel trend assumption holds. We then show
that our results hold when accounting for a range of time-variant characteristics of both insti-
tutions and firms. One important threat for our identification strategy is the possibility that
revolving door movements are endogenous, in the sense that they are triggered by specific
firm- or institution-time variant shocks that also have an impact on their procurement be-
havior. Our main specification controls for firm-time or institution-time specific fixed effects
that flexibly account for such potential shocks. Finally, we also distinguish revolving door
workers by type of positions (permanent civil servants versus appointees) and hierarchical
level (directors versus other employees).
Interestingly, we uncover both significant positive and negative effects. Our main result
is that administration-to-supplier movements, which are the usual target of revolving door
laws and regulations, appear to be beneficial to public bodies, in the sense that they lead
to purchases at lower prices. More precisely, we find that a public administration employing
a public official who in the future will work for a private provider acquires products from
the latter at a price that is 13% lower, while no specific distortions are found regarding
quantities or the award procedures used. Once this particular public official moves to the
private provider, the latter sells more and at lower prices to that public entity.
However, we also show that this effect holds only for civil servants, but not for political
appointees who actually increase the transaction price after moving to the private sector. We
argue that the main channel at play here involves career public sector workers attempting to
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signal competence and special skills to potential post agency employers by doing their job
thoroughly, hence improving procurement efficiency.2
To investigate whether the willingness to signal competence explain our findings, we use a
structural break in the nature of the Brazilian procurement process, linked to the introduction
of the mandatory use of reverse electronic auctions for a range of purchase in 2005. The large
increase in the share of such auctions after this date constrained the ability of procurement
officials to provide inside information to connected parties, thus allowing us to disentangle the
channels at play behind our results. The persistence of the positive effect after 2005, when
collusive behavior such as leaking bid prices becomes increasingly difficult, gives support to
the signaling story.
On the other hand, we find that supplier-to-administration movements appear to be neutral
or even detrimental in some case, with imprecisely estimated coefficients. In the case of
private workers moving to the public administration, the latter buys larger amounts from the
connected private provider, at prices that are equal or larger than the counterfactual.
Based on our findings, we perform back-of-the-envelope calculations of the aggregate im-
pact of revolving door practices on public sector procurement spending. They show that
administration-to-firm movements lead to savings of a bit more than 3.5% of total spending,
while firm-to-administration movements increase spending by 1.3%.
Our results have important implications for the regulation of revolving door practices in
the context of developing countries. They point to differentiated conclusions depending on the
direction of movements as well as the type of positions involved. In particular, it appears that
some flexibility for public-to-private movements of career public servants may be desirable in
a developing country context in which human capital is scarce or difficult to attract to public
positions.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature and explains
our contributions. Section 3 describes the institutional aspects of public procurement and
the labor market for public officials and private sector workers in Brazil. Section 4 details
the datasets on procurement contracts and careers, and discusses how they were merged to
generate the revolving door indicators. Section 5 describes the empirical strategy, and Section
6 presents the main econometric results and discusses the channels. Section 7 summarizes
the aggregate costs and benefits, Section 8 addresses policy implications, and Section 9 con-
cludes. Additional material, including evidence on the impact of revolving doors on workers’
remunerations, is in the Supplementary Section.
2This positive effect distinguishes revolving doors, where both sides win from the relationship, from pure
lobbying effect, where only the private party does.
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2 Related Literature and Contribution
The paper contributes to several strands of the literature. First, it adds to a small but grow-
ing literature that documents the existence and consequences of revolving door practices in
different industries. To date, contributions have focused on the finance, defense and lobbying
sectors and are mostly restricted to the U.S..
Several papers provide evidence of connections and relational capital being the main assets
of revolving individuals. This is the case of Blanes i Vidal, Draca, and Fons-Rosen (2012)
and Bertrand, Bombardini and Trebbi (2014), who study the lobbying industry, Cornaggia,
Cornaggia, and Xia (2016), who find that credit analysts award inflated ratings to their
future employers before switching jobs, and Tabakovic and Wollmann (2018), who show that
patent examiners grant more patents to their future employers. On the other hand, Lucca,
Seru and Trebbi (2014) conclude that the learning and ability channel prevails in the finance
industry, and Kempf (2020) finds that movers from rating agencies to investment banks tend
to outperform their peers in terms of accuracy, with the exception of ratings related to their
future employers.
We add to this literature in several ways. First, we document the existence and impact of
revolving door practices in the context of procurement. This matters because procurement is
one of the major channels of public expenditures: according to the OECD, as of 2011 public
procurement represented 26.1% of government expenditures and 10.2% of Brazilian GDP.
Second, this is the first paper to provide such revolving door evidence for a large emerging
country, using large-scale administrative data.
Third, thanks to our focus on standardized goods and the information on prices, we can
effectively measure the gains and losses for public bodies created by revolving door move-
ments.3 Fourth, we are able to disentangle revolving door effects depending on the direction
and timing of movements, i.e., whether these movements are from the public to the private
sector, or the reverse, and whether they happen before or after the transaction of interest.
This allows us to show that in the context of Brazilian public procurement not all revolving
door movements have similar effects, and hence points to the need to fine-tune the related
policy recommendations.
Our findings reflect the theoretical literature that has pointed out both the potential social
benefits and the costs of an open revolving door between the public and the private sectors.
Che (1995) builds a regulation model in which the regulator has revolving door concerns
affecting his performance incentives. He concludes that stronger monitoring effort by public
3Asai et al. (2018) document public-to-private revolving door practices in public construction projects in
Japan, but only estimate changes in the probability of firms winning contracts after hiring a public official.
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officials seeking to signal competence on the job leads to better outcomes for society, while
lenient or collusive behavior in the form of decreased monitoring effort leads to the opposite.
Bar-Isaac and Shapiro (2011) and Bond and Glode (2013) model worker movements from
credit rating and regulatory agencies, respectively, to banks, and show that when individuals
are hired primarily because of their expertise, they have incentive to invest in their industry
qualifications or to signal their expertise during their employment as regulators.4
In addition, this paper has a close connection to the literature on public procurement. Sev-
eral channels for wrongdoing have been studied, including bid-rigging, collusion and different
types of red tape and waste.5 Public officials’ career concerns and revolving door issues are
often mentioned in the press as a likely pervasive channel for wrongdoing in many countries,
but their actual impact on procurement outcomes has not yet been documented empirically.
Also relevant are recent papers that look at the effect of political connections on the
allocation of procurement contracts, such as Goldman, Rocholl and So (2013), Straub (2014),
Boas, Hidalgo and Richardson (2014), and Arvate, Barbosa and Fuzitani (2019).6 The present
paper differs from these contributions in that it does not focus on connections arising from
firms’ directors, board members and campaign contributors having ties to political parties or
high ranking politicians, but on a much more pervasive channel involving the direct movements
of workers in charge of procurement between supplier firms and public offices.
Finally, a few recent papers have shown that the characteristics of workers involved in
the procurement process, such as their tenure or the incentives they face, significantly affects
outcomes.7 More generally, our findings add to that emerging body of knowledge on how
internal public servants’ incentives map into the performance of public services.8
4Other relevant theoretical references include career concerns models, such as Holmstrom (1999), Tirole
(1994), and Mattozzi and Merlo (2008), as well as the dynamic regulation frameworks of Laffont and Tirole
(1993), Salant (1995), and Martimort (1999) among others.
5Contributions that have dealt specifically with corruption in public procurement include Di Tella and
Schargrodsky (2003), Bandiera, Prat and Valletti (2009), Auriol, Straub and Flochel (2016), Decarolis, Fisman,
Pinotti, and Vannutelli (2020), and Decarolis and Giorgiantonio (2020), to mention only a few. Dimitri, Piga
and Spagnolo (2006) provide an early review of the literature on procurement practices.
6More generally, our paper is related to studies showing that firms with personal and financial connections to
politicians boast higher stock valuation and enjoy favorable access to resources such as loans from government
banks or regulatory favors. See, among others, Fisman (2001), Johnson and Mitton (2003), Khwaja and Mian
(2005), Ferguson and Voth (2008), Claessens, Feijen and Laeven (2008), and Luechinger and Moser (2014).
7Best, Hjort and Szakonyi (2017), Coviello and Gagliarducci (2017), Decarolis, Giuffrida, Iossa, Mollisi and
Spagnolo (2016), and Lacetera, Larsen, Pope and Sydnor (2016) among others.
8Finan, Olken and Pande (2015); Cameron, de Figueiredo and Lewis (2016).
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3 Institutional Background
Public Procurement Process. Public procurement rules in Brazil follow the 1993 Public
Procurement Act (Law 8,666) in terms of product description, publicity, and award proce-
dures.9 In the case of health procurement, public hospitals, and health agencies and centers
receive an annual budget, which they use to acquire medical supplies, equipment for hospitals,
and pharmaceuticals in a decentralized way.
Subject to the legal obligation to rely on auction-based mechanisms, public entities choose
the award mechanism according to the size of procurement transaction. While large purchase
must be made through open competitive bidding, smaller ones can be realized through invited
bidding or direct purchase in exceptional cases (very small amounts or lack of potential com-
petition, for example in case of patented products). Since around 2005, electronic auctions
are the main vehicle and they should be used to purchase standardized goods and services in
most cases.
In electronic reverse auctions, the lowest bid is the only criterion to select suppliers. On
the other hand, in physical auctions public entities may use other selection criteria, such as
best technique (precision, safety, and durability, i.e., quality), or best technique and price.
This combination of ability to invite bidders and to rely on other criteria than prices
therefore affords public buyers a margin of discretion that is crucial in explaining the results
that we find in the empirical section.
The Revolving Door Legislation. Movement of individuals between public administra-
tions and private organizations in Brazil is regulated by revolving door rules (Provisional
Measure 2,216-37/2001, Decree 4,187/2002, Decree 4,405/2002 and Law 12,813/2013), which
basically impose time constraints on the ability of a particular set of high-level public officials
to move from their offices to the private sector.
Cabinet ministers, directors of regulatory agencies, commissioners of the Brazilian Compe-
tition Authority (CADE), governors and directors of the Central Bank of Brazil, and presidents
of state-owned companies are prohibited from working for private organizations during a six-
month cooling-off period.10 Noncompliance with the regulations can bring severe sanctions
and penalties, including fines.
While the legislation imposes restrictions on revolving door of high-level public workers, it
generally does not restrict public officials’ movements to suppliers, and movements of supplier
workers to public administrations (including their procurement offices).11
9See more specific details in the Supplementary Material.
10In 2013, Law 12,813 established that high-level appointees are also subject to the same restrictions.
11Specific regulations relative to public sector and private sector workers’ careers are described in the
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4 Data
In order to build a set of revolving door variables, we match the procurement dataset Com-
prasNet Data Warehouse with the employer-employee data from RAIS. We start by describing
each data source and the way the matching process was performed. We then describe in details
the different revolving door variables. Finally, we provide descriptive statistics.12
4.1 Primary Datasets
ComprasNet Data Warehouse. It contains information on all procurement transactions
made by the federal government, and on all purchases made by state and local governments
in pooled procurement with federal bodies. In this paper, we focus on purchases of medical
supplies, hospital equipment and prescription drugs, i.e., standardized products recurrently
acquired by different public administrations (national university hospitals, public medical
centers, and health agencies). This data on public procurement contracts was obtained from
the Ministry of Planning, Budget and Management (Ministério do Planejamento, Orçamento
e Gestão - MP). The dataset contains all contracts for this type of goods over the period
2000-2009. It comprises 2,299,786 contracts over a set of 1,942,210 different items-products,13
between 50,481 firms and 977 administrations.14
For each contract, information covers a full description and codification of the product
purchased, the kind of procurement contract used, the award mechanism, the identity of the
public officials responsible for the procurement transaction (including negotiators), the reserve
price in the procurement auction and the price paid, the month and year of purchase and
quantity purchased, the identity of buyers (public administrations) and suppliers (winning
firms), including their names, taxpayer identification numbers (CNPJ), and locations. All
products are described, standardized, and codified according to the Brazilian Materials and
Services Code. This allows us to make a rigorous comparison between prices paid for very
similar products when buying from different suppliers and using different award mechanisms.15
Supplementary Material.
12Table S1 in the supplementary material presents all variables used in the paper, along with their definitions
and sources. Tables S2 and S3 detail the structure of the procurement data and provide basic descriptive
statistics.
13The product space is highly skewed, with a relatively limited number of standard products representing a
large share of the total.
14The 10 most common buyers/administrations are the procurement offices of the national university hospi-
tals, which awarded 18.6% of the total number of contracts between 2000-2009 (an average of 50,000 contracts
per buyer). The less frequent buyers are national army branches and regional appellate courts, which got an
average of 500 contracts each.
15In Brazil, the standardization and codification of prescription drugs and hospital equipment started in
2000 at the initiative of the Ministry of Health. The aim was to create a national catalog of standardized
health products, which includes prescription drugs and medical and hospital equipment, in order to unify the
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RAIS. RAIS (Relação Anual de Informações Sociais) is a comprehensive longitudinal
matched employer-employee administrative dataset obtained from an annual census of all for-
mal workers in Brazil, which is widely recognized as high-quality (Menezes-Filho, Muendler
and Ramey, 2008; Dix-Carneiro, 2014). It is assembled from mandatory reporting by firms and
has been compiled yearly by the Brazilian Ministry of Labor since 1976. It contains above 40
million observations per year and includes information on earnings, demographic characteris-
tics (level of education, age, gender), occupations and other aspects of the job (tenure, weekly
working hours, features of the employment contract), current and past employers, along with
their identification numbers, locations and industries. In addition, there is information on
hierarchical level (directors versus other employees) and type of position (permanent civil
servants versus appointees). RAIS covers all public and private sector jobs, except for a few
categories of workers (a subset of self-employed individuals and elected politicians) for which
employers are not required to report information to the Ministry of Labor.16
Workers have an incentive to be accurately reported in RAIS in order to be eligible to
receive the government benefits they are entitled to.17 Given that employers are subject to
severe fines if they do not regularly submit to the Ministry of Labor the information about
their workers, firms also have incentives to precisely provide such information via RAIS.
The data consists of job entries identified by both worker identification number (PIS) and
firm-plant identification number on the National Registry of Legal Entities (CNPJ). These
identifiers are unique and do not change over time. That allows us to track individuals over
time and across employers (firms/administrations). In order to have at least two years of pre-
data for the analysis of the effect of worker movements between administrations and firms,
we make use of the RAIS database for the period between 1998 and 2009.18
Matching process. To merge the data on procurement with those on workers’ careers, the
first step is to extract from the RAIS data all individuals who worked at some point during
the 1998-2009 period for any of the firms and administrations that appear in the procurement
data. This is done by matching the firm and public administration CNPJ numbers between
language within different spheres of the Brazilian government.
16Because RAIS is a census of the Brazilian formal labor market only, we cannot follow individuals that
always have been working for the informal sector. We also lose track of workers who do not hold a job in the
formal sector in a given year, but we can track them again once they return to a formal job.
17For example, RAIS is the main tool used by the government to enable the payment of the “abono salarial”
to eligible workers. Abono salarial is a government program that pays one minimum monthly wage at the end
of the year to workers whose average monthly wage was below two times the minimum wage and whose job
information was correctly declared in RAIS - among other minor requirements.
18Details on how this information is extracted from RAIS is in the Supplementary Material section.
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the two datasets,19 and it yields a subset of 10,050,913 workers.
For all firm-administration pairs that had one or more contracts at some point during
the period of analysis, we then identify among these individuals those who have worked for
both members of the pair, and create dummy variables capturing those movements. These
“revolving door” variables are described next.
4.2 Revolving Door Measures
For each contract-level observation indexed by j (firm), k (administration), and t (time), we
construct four different measures of workers’ movement, which capture whether the movement
is from the private to the public sector or the reverse, and where the revolving door employees
are located at the time of contracting.
Figure 1 shows our four revolving door dummy variables. Their names indicate the order
of movement, as well as the ‘location’ of the revolving door individuals at the time of the
contract between the members of the pair, i.e., the stage of the relationship (Pre or Post).
For example, Admin-Firm-Pre means that at the time of a contract closure there are employees
who are currently working for the administration and will move to the firm later on, while
Admin-Firm-Post means there are employees working for the firm, who have previously worked
for the administration.20
In our main estimations below, we use an “any time” version of these dummies. This
means for example that Admin-Firm-Postjkt takes value 1 if firm j employs at time t some
individual who has worked for administration j in at least one time period before t.
In addition, by summing variables Admin-Firm-Prejkt and Admin-Firm-Postjkt (resp.
Firm-Admin-Prejkt and Firm-Admin-Postjkt), we obtain a dummy variable that conflates both
stages of the relationship, i.e., is equal to one for a given firm-administration pair in all periods
where one or more admin-to-firm (resp. firm-to-admin) revolving door workers are active in
one of the contracting parties. This variable is named Admin-Firmjkt (resp. Firm-Adminjkt).
Three aspects are worth noting. First, distinguishing the different stages of the revolving
door relationship is important because incentives and the behavior of workers may differ across
these stages. Second, when identifying revolving door workers, we focus on all the individuals
active in the firms and administrations, as it is not always possible to define precisely who
has a say in the procurement process.
Third, as an extension we also consider that the impact of revolving door movements
19The CNPJ code consists of a 14-digit number, where the first eight digits identify the company, and the
others the branch or subsidiary. We identify firms and administration by the first eight digits of their CNPJ.
20See a detailed definition of each of the dummy variables in the Supplementary Material.
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on public-private procurement transactions is likely to depend on the hierarchical position
and employment contract type of the moving individuals. To investigate the revolving door
effects according to these dimensions, we further categorize the four revolving door dummies
described above according to the kind of public sector engagement (appointees, permanent
civil servants, and temporary workers) and the hierarchical level (directors/managers vs. other
workers) of the moving workers.
4.3 Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 shows that over 2% of all contracts involve some revolving door connection, repre-
senting 5.4% of the value transacted over the period. It also important to note significant
overlaps between the different revolving door dummy variables. Indeed, out of the 20,472
contracts with admin-to-firm connections and the 26,835 with firm-to-admin ones, 8,389 have
both types simultaneously, corresponding to a 0.3 correlation between the two dummies.
At the worker level, in our sample 3,639 individuals completed a movement from an ad-
ministration to one of its private supplier, and 5,164 moved in the other direction (Table 2).
Of these, the vast majority (91%) were employed as regular civil servants while in the public
sector, between 4 and 6% were appointees (152 and 295 respectively), and an even smaller
number, 1 to 2% corresponding to 39 and 125, were directors, most of them with appointed
terms.
Note that our paper is based on a larger number of revolving door workers than other
related papers in the literature. For instance, Blanes i Vidal, Draca, and Fons-Rosen (2012)
study 257 lobbyists with previous experience in the office of a U.S. Senator, and Luechinger and
Moser (2014) study 85 U.S. Department of Defense political appointments from the private
sector and 85 corporate appointments of former government officials from the U.S. Department
of Defense. On private-to-private revolving doors, Geiger, Lennox, and North (2008) study
193 officers, who were hired from firms’ auditors, and Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy (2012)
track the careers of 51 equity analysts hired to sit on the boards of directors of companies
they previously covered. Cornaggia, Cornaggia, and Xia (2016) and Kempf (2020) study,
respectively, 179 and 33 credit analysts that left rating agencies to work at firms they rated.
5 Empirical Strategy
To identify how workers’ movements affect procurement prices pljkt, we use the contract-level
dataset, where an observation is a purchase agreement for a good l, between firm j and
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administration k, at time t. We estimate the following equation:
ln pljkt = αl + κt + τjk +RD′jktβ + γqljkt + δjt + ηkt + uljkt, (1)
where on the right-hand side αl, κt and τjk are product, time (months and years), and firm-
administration pair fixed effects respectively, qljkt is the quantity purchased in that transaction,
and δjt and ηkt are firm-time and administration-time fixed effects respectively. The variable
uljkt is an error term, which is assumed to have expectation zero, a firm-administration pair-
specific variance, denoted by σ2jk, and to be uncorrelated with other regressors in equation
(1). In all estimations, we cluster standard errors at the firm-administration level.21
The main variable of interest is RDjkt, which captures the existence of a revolving door
connection within the firm-administration pair jk at time t. We gradually unpack it by
estimating three successive specifications where:
• RDjkt = 1 if at least one of the four dummy variables defined in Section 4.2 is equal to
1. This is our ‘Any Revolving Door’ measure that captures the generic effect of a pair
having some type of revolving door worker.
• RDjkt is the vector (Admin-Firmjkt Firm-Adminjkt). This disentangles the overall im-
pact of revolving door connections between the two directions of movements, to assess
whether public-to-private and private-to-public revolving doors have different impacts
on procurement outcomes.
• RDjkt is the vector (Admin-Firm-Prejkt Admin-Firm-Postjkt Firm-Admin-Prejkt Firm-
Admin-Postjkt). This further disentangles movements in each directions in their first-
and second-stage components, allowing for a finer understanding of the dynamics of
revolving door movements.
In these three specifications, the effect of all types of connections are thus estimated jointly,
at a gradually increasing level of disaggregation. For each type of revolving door connection,
the reported effects are therefore net of the impact of any other types of connection. This
is important since the descriptive statistics show that pairs may experience several type of
connections simultaneously.
21Due to the large number of firm-administration pairs (154,673) and products (1,942,210), usual statistical
software cannot estimate these equations with all the fixed effects. We therefore transform the original variables
into deviations from firm-administration pair means, and then use Correia (2016) estimator of linear models
with high dimensional fixed effects. To avoid overstating statistical significance, singleton groups are dropped
for fixed effects that are nested within clusters (see also Correia, 2015). See the supplementary material for
details on how equations (1) and (2) are transformed.
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We also estimate the impact of revolving doors on the total amount of contracts in a pair
in a given year. For this, we collapse the data at the firm-administration-year level:
ln yjkt = κt + τjk +RD′jktβ + δjt + ηkt + νjkt. (2)
We build a balanced panel, including years in which a supplier-administration pair does not
transact. This allows is to evaluate both the intensive and the extensive margin.22 In addition,
we also provide results restricted to the intensive margin for the sake of interpretation. In
equation (2), the error term νjkt is assumed to have expectation zero, a firm-administration
pair-specific variance, denoted by σ2jk, and to be uncorrelated with other regressors. As before,
we cluster standard errors at the firm-administration level in all estimations.
A few things are important to note regarding identification. First, it is possible that the
existence of a revolving door connection in a given firm-administration pair is correlated with
specific attributes of that pair. To the extent that these are time-invariant, for example if they
stem from long-term repeated relationships or from previous individual connections in the case
of a firm created by a former public employee to conduct business with its former institution,
our within-pair estimates ensure that such determinants are taken care of. The inclusion of
firm-administration pair fixed effects implies that the revolving door dummy coefficients are
identified within pairs, i.e., from those pairs for which the dummies change value at some
point during the 2000-2009 period as a pair revolving door connection is established or lost.23
In addition, we control for a number of time-variant attributes. At the firm-administration
pair-level, the main issue has to do with the potential influence of other types of relationships
that would change during the period of interest, so we crucially include all types of connections
simultaneously, as explained above.
The main concern left is potential time-variant confounders at the firm- and administration-
level. Time-variant firm characteristics, such as productivity shocks or the decision to enter
the procurement market of some specific products, may affect sales to the federal government
as well as firms’ willingness to hire qualified public officials, and potentially confound our es-
timates. Similarly, administration-level shocks, such as budget changes, or expansions related
to the inception of new government programs, may affect the acquisition of goods and services
and the need for new staff, some of which may come from previous suppliers. We deal with
this in two ways.
In our preferred specification, shown in (1) and (2), we include firm-time and administration-
22Given the inclusion of zeros, we use the hyperbolic inverse sine transformation to log amount values.
23This estimation strategy is similar to the one in Blanes i Vidal et al. (2012), who use within lobbyist
variations as they lose connection to politicians.
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time specific fixed effects that generically capture such potentially unobserved shocks. Alter-
natively, we also show results including instead a number of time-variant controls, including
year-on-year administration budgets, firm sales, and contract-specific award procedures.24
Finally, our estimates may also be affected by measurement error. Some pairs may be
using other channels to collude or support long term relationships, for example through side
payments and bribes, or shareholder-level connections for example. This would likely generate
an attenuation bias if such channels are substitutes. We cannot address this with the data at
hand, absent specific information on other channels, but note that this limitation of course
applies broadly to the empirical political connections and corruption literature.
6 Main Results
Prices. Table 3 summarizes the results of estimating equation (1) using the contract-level
dataset. In columns 1 to 3, we estimate the price effect of any revolving door. Our basic
specification, which includes pair, time, and product fixed effects, indicates that connected
pairs’ transactions exhibit a 18% drop in prices. The coefficient is reduced slightly when
adding time-variant controls in column 2 (15%). Our preferred specification in column 3,
including firm-time and administration-time fixed effects, yields a 13% price drop, significant
at the 1% level.
This net effect appears to be beneficial for the public sector, which buys more at lower
prices. While this is a striking result in itself, it may mask important composition effects to
which we turn next.
We first disentangle the two directions of movements: public-to-private (A-F) and private-
to-public (F-A) by simultaneously estimating the impact of the Admin-Firm and Firm-Admin
dummies. In columns 4 to 6, the effect of administration-to-firm movement is clearly nega-
tive and significant, with a magnitude between 18% and 30%. On the other hand, firm-to-
administration movements have a quite precisely estimated null effect.
Finally, in columns 7 to 9, we break both directions of movement in their successive stages.
Regarding the public-to-private movements, the results show that the effect are stronger in
the first stage of the relationship, when the workers are in the public sector (-18% in our
preferred specification in column 9), but also that they do subside after they join the private
counterparts (-10%).
24Because of the concern that some of these controls may be endogenous, for example if aggregate budgets or
sales change as a result of the entry of revolving door workers, we use values of the previous year. We exclude
workers’ characteristics such as average wage from the set of controls, both because of these endogeneity
concerns and of a high number of missing values.
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Amounts of contracts. Table 4 provides the results of estimating equation (2) using the
balanced data set summarizing firm-administration yearly amount of contracts. In columns 1
to 3, pairs experiencing any revolving door appear to generate an additional 11% in contract
amounts. Columns 4 to 6 show that this is driven mainly by pairs with private-to-public
revolving door movements. Pairs with this type of connection trade an additional 16% amount
yearly in our preferred specification.25
Finally, columns 7 to 9 offer additional insights into the dynamic of these results. For
pairs with movements from the administration to the firm, a positive effect (+16%) appears
once the workers have moved to the firm, but it is only significant at the 10% level. For pairs
with movements from the firm to the administration on the other hand, the positive impact
(+27%, significant at the 1% level) is only in the first stage of the relationship, i.e., when the
worker is still in the private sector.
These results conflate changes on the extensive and intensive margin, as they include, for
all pairs that are active at some point, zero values in year without activities. Table S4 in
the Appendix provides estimates based on the unbalanced panel composed of strictly positive
values only, i.e., on the intensive margin. In our preferred specification, we find a large increase
in amounts once workers move from the public to the private sector (A-F-Post), as well as an
increase when workers have moved from the private to the public sector (F-A-Post), although
slightly less significant.
The results in Table 4, combined with the ones in Table S4, indicate that administration-
to-firm movements lead to an increase in the amount of contracts when a former public
worker is already in the firm, especially for firms which recurrently trade with administrations.
On the other hand, those estimations reveal that firm-administration movements have more
extensive margin effects, in that they allow firms to start doing business with the connected
administrations.
Robustness and additional results. As discussed in Section 5 above, our results are
robust to the inclusion of a variety of time-invariant and time-variant confounders. In partic-
ular, our preferred specification, which includes firm-year and administration-year fixed effects,
makes us confident that they are not driven by some unobserved productivity or policy shocks.
In order to validate our diff-in-diff strategy, we need to evaluate whether the parallel trend
assumption holds. Figure 2 and Table 5 show the results of a year-by-year specification when
25Controls accounts for little additional variation on yearly amount compared to the firm and admin fixed
effects once we collapse at the firm-administration-year level. That explains why the estimates in columns 2,
5 and 8 of Table 4 are very similar to ones in columns 1, 4 and 7 in the same table.
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two lags and leads are included.26 They strongly support the parallel trend assumption for
both prices and amounts.27
Next, we estimate two additional specifications in order to provide additional elements of
interpretation. First, we exploit a fundamental evolution in the organization of public pro-
curement tenders that occurred mid-way through our period of analysis. Decree 5.450/2005,
in its article 4, established the obligatory use of reverse electronic auctions for the acquisition
of goods and common services by most public entities.28 As a result, the share of reverse
electronic auctions jumped sharply between 2005 and 2006. In our sample, Figure 3 shows
that this share went from 2% of the total amount of contracts in 2005 to 42% the year after,
and kept increasing after that.29
This change is likely to have constrained the channels through which workers involved in
the procurement process can influence the award and terms of the contracts. In particular,
electronic auctions, because they are a fully automated process in which procurement officials
are unlikely to have access to the bids, restricts their ability to leak information on the bids
of rivals to favor specific bidders. Hence, we expect outcomes due to such behavior to vanish
after 2005.
We thus compare the period before and after this structural break, by adding to (1) and
(2) an interaction (RD′jkt ∗ Post2005), where Post2005 is a dummy equal to 1 in all years
starting 2006.
Results are summarized in Figure 4.30 The upper part shows the outcomes for pairs
with administration-to-firm movements. The negative price effect is very stable across the
two periods, while a positive impact on amounts traded appears after 2005. For pairs with
firm-to-administration movements, on the other hand, the results are very different across sub-
periods. The impact on price goes from negative before 2005 to positive after that, although
it is not significant in both periods, while the positive effect on amounts found above vanishes
after 2005.
These results are consistent with a positive view of the channels at play in public-to-private
revolving door connections, at least one that does not involve leaking sensitive information
26As in Table 4, controls generate little additional variation on yearly amount in Table 5.
27For any given firm-administration pair, the treatment, i.e., the first appearance of a worker who will go
on to work for both members of the pair, may occur at any time during the period under analysis. As a
result, normalizing all pairs time-path to include a sufficient number of lags generates a strong reduction
in the number of observations included. We choose to retain two lags and leads to maintain the sample
representativeness.
28See TCU (2012) for the detail of the normative change. Ferraz, Finan, and Szerman (2016) provide a
description of these auctions.
29The transition in terms of the share of the number of contracts was similar, although it already started
during 2005 for a group of smaller contracts: it was 2% in 2004, 24% in 2005, and 46% in 2006.
30The corresponding results are in Table 6.
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to favor firms. For private-to-public connections, they are compatible with a collusion story
made more difficult after 2005.
Second, we differentiate the connections according to revolving door workers’ roles in the
public sector -appointees, civil servants, or temporary workers- and their hierarchical position
-directors/managers-, by adding to (1) and (2) an interaction (RD′jkt ∗ Dw), where Dw is
the corresponding worker type dummy. Results by types of workers are in Figure S1 and
Table S5 in the Appendix.31 The price-decreasing effect of public-to-private sector movements
uncovered above is entirely due to the category of regular civil servants. We also find a negative
price effect of private-to-public revolving door appointees. In addition, civil servants moving
from the private to the public sector lead to larger amounts being procured from their former
firms.
Finally, we investigate a number of additional effects and outcomes in the Supplementary
Material. First, we analyze whether revolving door workers generate ‘spillover’ for other firms
or administrations beside the specific pairs in which they operate. The results, displayed in
Table S7, show that such spillovers indeed exist for directors, who decrease prices for all firms
their administration deals with when in the first term of the public-to-private transition, but
they are insignificant for other categories of workers. This is consistent with information from
Ministry of Planning’s ENAP (Escola Nacional de Administraç ao Pública), which indicates
mandatory turnover of most workers in public institutions’ procurement committees, leaving
directors as the only officials systematically dealing with all providers over time.32 In addition,
Table S8 shows that revolving door workers do not lead to a significant increase in the use
of less stringent awarding procedures, including direct purchase and less restrictive auction
forms.
Interpretation.
Administration-to-supplier movements. Regarding public-to-private movements, our
interpretation of the findings is that while in the public sector, the worker attempts to display
competence by doing his job thoroughly. In doing so, he brings prices down in deals with his
potential future employer. Having secured a post-administration job, the worker now uses his
skills to allow the firm that hired him to win more contracts at lower prices. Presumably, this
goes through tougher competition, hence lower prices, but compared to the period he was in
public office, the firm wins more contracts.
31These results should be considered as illustrative only, as some of them may lack statistical power. We
only discuss the results for civil servants and appointees, as the one for directors yield no significant results,
probably because of the small number of directors in our sample, which leads to very large standard errors.
32See https://repositorio.enap.gov.br/handle/1/2122, last accessed May, 5, 2020.
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Overall, these gains support a benign, efficiency-enhancing view of public-to-private revolv-
ing door, in which it creates incentives for career public officials to perform while they work
in the administration, and the public sector benefits through better procurement outcomes
throughout the workers’ career cycle.33
Our additional results also allow us to discard two alternative explanations. The first one
is that these positive results point to a personal connection between the public official and
the firm. Maybe the worker knows this firm to be good, since he dealt with it many times, or
maybe it is not better than others but he has connections there. This official could provide
the firm with inside information on other bids, leading the firm to systematically undercut
rivals and win contracts. He would then be rewarded with a late career job in the firm.
However, this interpretation is hard to reconcile with three facts. First, we do not find a
significant increase in the amount of contracts in the first stage of the relationship, which is
inconsistent with the firm benefiting from leaked information to win more contracts. We do
not see a significant increase in the use of less stringent awarding procedures either, which
could have been another sign of favoritism. Next, in the second period the firm employing
the worker is still selling at lower prices to its former administration. Finally, and this is key,
our results for the post 2005 period, when electronic reverse auctions become the dominant
procedure, are inconsistent with this story. Had bid leakage been the channel behind the
observed price decrease, it should have become less important one these auctions took over.
However, we find the price effect to be unchanged after 2005.
The second alternative explanation is that the movements of workers from a public admin-
istration to a private provider are strategically planned by suppliers trying to remove tough
officials from procurement positions. By hiring these public workers, private providers hope
to face more lenient or corruptible ones in future procurement transactions, therefore being
able to sell more at higher prices. However, this again is not compatible with the observed
drop in prices after the former public officer moves to the private provider.
Supplier-to-administration movements. The results for pairs with movements from the
private to the public sector tell a very different story. First, we see firms getting larger
amounts of contracts thanks to the revolving door connections, but no decrease in prices.
Second, the post 2005 evolution is exactly the opposite of the one described above. As more
secure procedures are implemented, we see the prices at which these connected pairs trade
increase, while the amounts decrease. This is consistent with a collusion story, in which
33This interpretation is also consistent with the evidence on positive spillovers found in the case of directors.
The lack of significance for all workers is likely due to the fact that other workers deal with only a limited
number of firms each, and generally for limited periods of time.
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the workers were getting privileged information from public sector connections to win more
contracts while in the firm, and got later rewarded with a job in the public sector, but this
advantage disappeared after 2005.
Our results by workers type offer further details. There is a decrease in prices specifically
driven by future appointees in the two stages of the firm-to-administration revolving door
process. This is likely to indicate that they are using their political connections to get inside
information leading to more contracts for the firm where they work, and are later rewarded
with a good job in the public sector where they use their position to favor their former em-
ployer.34 As for civil servants, their moving from a firm to the public sector appear to generate
a persistent increase in amounts procured from their former private employers, but no price
decrease, again consistent with collusion. Note that Colonnelli, Prem, and Teso (2019), Bar-
bosa and Ferreira (2019) and Brollo, Forquesato and Gozzi (2017) show that the competitive
process governing civil servant hiring is to a large degree subject to discretion, fraud, and
corruption, and hence unlikely to provide much of a protection against such arrangements.
7 Aggregate Impact
We can now compute a back-of-the-envelope aggregate impact of revolving doors on procure-
ment spending.








where pi and qi are the observed prices and quantities for each contract i, and we make appar-
ent that contracts belong to RD and NRD, which are, respectively, the subsets of transactions
with and without active revolving doors.
We can then compute an approximate value of total spending assuming that we shut
down the revolving door, i.e., we bring contract value for the relevant observations back to
the counterfactual value without revolving door.35
Given βRDpq , which is the estimated semi-elasticity of revolving door contract value, for
contracts of observed value piqi in the set RD, the predicted values from shutting down the
revolving door is ¯piqi = piqi1+βRDpq .
34See for example anecdotal evidence of such practices in Folha de Sao Paulo, 14/01/2016, Journal O Globo,
27/03/2012.
35The derivations that follow are based on the estimates of the impact of revolving doors on contract value
(price x quantity) shown in Table S6 in the Supplementary Material. They are largely unchanged if using
instead separate elasticities for price and volume (contract size).
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In Table 7 we present the results from computing S̄ − S, making explicit separately the
value computed for the admin-to-firm and firm-to-admin connections.
First, the beneficial effects of admin-to-firm revolving doors are not negligible. Shutting
down this channel would imply a 3.5% increase in spending. The detrimental effects of firm-
to-admin effects are slightly smaller, at 1.3%.36 Extrapolating our revolving door results to a
total amount of procurement equal to the OECD estimate of 10% of GDP leads to gains and
losses of around 0.35% and 0.13% of GDP, respectively. Overall, shutting down the revolving
door would increase spending by to 2.2%, or 0.22% of GDP.
The values are also significant. Health procurement admin-to-firm revolving door savings
amount to R$ 772 million, while firm-to-admin losses represent R$ 281 million, approximately
equivalent to US$ 420 million and US$ 150 million respectively at the 2000 exchange rate.
We remain cautious about the interpretation of these figures. First, revolving door con-
nections may affect the nature of transactions along other margins, such as the quality of
products or the mix that public institutions acquire. However, assuming the average qual-
ity is approximately constant overall, a reasonable assumption for standardized goods and
services, lower spending can still be considered a beneficial outcome.
Second, there could be general equilibrium effects affecting other firms and the level of
overall competition for example. Finally, we have no way to estimate the ease of moving
across sectors, or to say it otherwise, the degree of openness of the revolving door, and what
would be optimal arrangements in that respect. We discuss these issues in terms of the policy
recommendations that can be drawn from our results in the next section.
8 Policy Implications
Given the possibility, individuals are likely to be willing to move across employers and exploit
their experience or their connections. In the supplementary material, we perform estimations
of the value of revolving door relationships for workers, using a model with additive fixed
effects for workers and public institutions. We find that revolving door individuals command
a significant wage premium, of around 25 to 30% of the average sample wage, but also that
this is very heterogeneous across workers’ type of contracts.
36Note that these are lower bounds on the effects, as they are computed lumping together effects at each
stage of the revolving door relationships that sometimes cancel each other.
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How should this be addressed? As discussed in the introduction, policies aimed at ad-
dressing conflicts of interest and corruption arising through revolving door practices lead to a
fundamental tradeoff between regulating or limiting revolving door opportunities on the one
hand, and fostering efficiency by allowing skilled individuals to move across sectors when this
proves beneficial.
In this paper, we have focused on the two directions of revolving door movements: from
the public to the private sector, sometimes referred to as post-public employment, as well as
from the private to the public sector, or pre-public employment. While some analysis has
recognized the need to address both,37 the policy recommendations often focus much more on
the first type of movements, which tend to capture public headlines.
The main recommendations for public to private transitions usually include cooling-off
periods such as the ones existing in Brazil, during which former public officials are not allowed
to take employment in the private entities they have been overseeing. Such periods typically
last one to two years, although in some specific cases lifetime inability can apply. In addition,
some countries or international organizations contemplate the obligation for former officials
to refer to some committee for advice or approval, although such steps are in most cases only
consultative.
Regarding private to public transitions, measures include mandated divestments of di-
rect interests such as stocks or board positions, and mandatory refusal or cooling-off periods
from deals and transactions that involve former employers. For example, relevant to our
procurement context, the World Bank imposes a one year cooling-off period on procurement
interactions for anyone having worked as staff or consultant for the organization.
Our analysis provides interesting insights on the relevance of these different remedies in
the context of public procurement. First, and perhaps surprisingly, private to public revolving
door appears to be the most detrimental channel.
The recommendations therefore are to reinforce the oversight of transition into the pub-
lic sector, in this case by closely monitoring potential financial ties with former employers,
and possibly by implementing strict rules regarding the handling of deals with them. Strict
cooling-off periods or even lifetime restrictions regarding any procurement activity in the pub-
lic institution may be necessary in the case of individuals coming from firms having previously
engaged in procurement transactions with that institution.
In addition, the fact that the civil servant recruitment process, although quite formalized,
appears to fail as a way to make a proper selection among mid-career workers needs to be
addressed.
37See Transparency International (2010).
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Finally, different workers categories appear to warrant differential treatment. In the case
of post-public employment, our results show a clear difference between career civil servants,
which movements appear beneficial, and political appointees. Rules may need to differentiate
between high-level appointees and regular public officials, including the higher levels of the
hierarchy, in order to avoid discouraging skilled individuals from seeking employment in the
public sector at the beginning of their careers. One way to make this effective would be to
impose the passage through a body in charge of approving post-public employment, with the
power to enforce its decisions.
9 Conclusion
In this paper, we study the link between workers’ two-way movements between public insti-
tutions and their private suppliers, and outcomes in Brazilian health public procurement.
Interestingly, we find evidence of both positive effects of administration-to-firm movements,
consistent with signaling by high-skill workers, and negative effects of firm-to-administration
ones, possibly related to collusion. Revolving doors in procurement jobs have important
monetary consequences. Workers obtain significant wage benefits, and we estimate a net
overall saving of 2.2% of total spending.
An important implication of our results relates to the fact that reverse electronic auctions
prove to have the ability of limiting harmful collusive practices, while still allowing the positive
effect of revolving door movement of skilled workers to happen.
Finally, these results point to specific policy implications related to the tolerance of re-
volving door practices. They indicate in particular that more attention needs to be devoted
to regulating potentially detrimental private-to-public types of movements, while possibly
avoiding the exclusive focus on director-level employees. On the other hand, in a developing
country context where skilled workers are potentially scarce in the public sector, keeping a
pathway open between the public and the private sector may be necessary to provide adequate
career incentives to prospective civil servants.
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Figures and Tables
Figure 1: Revolving Doors Dummies
Timeline
(Contracting time=t)






Notes: This figure provides a summary view of the four categories of revolving door variables used in the paper. All variables are
contract level ones, and t corresponds to the period in which the contract becomes effective. The dummy variables Admin−Firm
and Firm−Admin identify, respectively, movements of workers from administrations to firms, and from firms to administrations.
Admin − Firm − Pre identifies an official’s movement from an administration to a firm after contracting time t. The dummy
variable Admin−Firm−Post diagnoses the movement of an official that worked for an administration before contracting time t
and then moved to a firm/supplier. Firm−Admin− Pre identifies a worker’s movement from a firm to an administration after
contracting time t. Firm−Admin− Post establishes the movement of an official that worked for firm before contracting time t
and then moved to an administration.
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T-2 T-1 T+1 T+20
 
Yearly Amount
Any Revolving Door Variable
Revolving Doors - Parallel Trend
Notes: This figure displays the estimated impacts of revolving door movement (Any Revolving Door) on prices
and yearly amounts, including lags and leads, and their respective 95% confidence intervals. These estimations
correspond to estimated effects reported in Column 3, for prices, and Column 6, for amounts, of Table 5.
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Figure 3: Share of Electronic Reverse Auctions

































Contract Amount by Awarding Procedure 
Electronic Auction Direct Purchase Inegibilities Open Auction
Invited Bidding Two Stage Auction Restricted Bidding
Notes: This figure reports the fraction of each awarding procedure (as a share of the total amount of contracts)
used to allocate procurement contracts in each year of our study period. The percentage numbers displayed
in the figure correspond to the share of electronic reverse auctions in every year of our sample.
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Revolving Doors - Before and After 2005
Notes: This figure displays the estimated impact of revolving door movements (Admin-Firm, A-F; and Firm-
Admin, F-A) on procurement prices and yearly amounts, before and after 2005, and their respective 95%
confidence intervals. These estimations correspond to estimated effects reported in Column 3, for prices, and
Column 6, for amounts, of Table 6.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics - Revolving Door Workers and Procurement Transactions
1 2 3 4
Total Number Number RD RD Share % Total Amount
Contracts Contracts of RD Contracts
Any Revolving Door 1 950 318 39 722 2.04% 5.41%
Admin-Firm 1 968 618 20 472 1.05% 2.73%
Admin-Firm-Pre 1 968 618 12 169 0.62% 1.85%
Admin-Firm-Post 2 299 786 13 710 0.60% 1.86%
Firm-Admin 1 968 618 26 835 1.38% 5.01%
Firm-Admin-Pre 1 968 618 16 585 0.85% 4.46%
Firm-Admin-Post 2 299 786 19 050 0.83% 4.19%
Notes: This table presents contract-level summary statistics of revolving door connections.
In Column 1, “-Pre” variables have less observations as they cannot be computed for the
last sample year (2009).
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Table 2: Revolving Door Workers by Type of Employment
Types of Movements
Panel A - Admin-Firm Movements Number of Workers
Admin-Firm 3 639
Admin-Firm: Appointees 152
Admin-Firm: Civil Servants 3 304
Admin-Firm: Other Workers 183
Admin-Firm: Directors 39
Admin-Firm: Non-Directors 3 600
Admin-Firm: Appointees - Directors 35
Admin-Firm : Civil Servants - Directors 4
Admin-Firm: Other Workers - Directors 0
Panel B - Firm-Admin Movements Number of Workers
Firm-Admin 5 164
Firm-Admin: Appointees 295
Firm-Admin: Civil Servants 4 722
Firm-Admin: Other Workers 147
Firm-Admin: Directors 125
Firm-Admin: Non-Directors 5 039
Firm-Admin: Appointees - Directors 92
Firm-Admin: Civil Servants - Directors 24
Firm-Admin: Other Workers - Directors 9
Notes: This table reports the total number of workers that move from
administrations to firms, and from firms to administrations, by type of
position (civil servants, appointees, and others) and by their hierarchical
level (directors and non-directors). Panel A shows the total number of
workers involved in admin-to-firm movements. Panel B shows the total
number of workers involved in firm-to-admin movements.
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Table 3: Price - Main Results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Variables Price Price Price Price Price Price Price Price Price
Any Revolving -0.180** -0.146** -0.129***
Door (0.078) (0.074) (0.044)
A-F -0.298*** -0.247*** -0.176***
(0.071) (0.066) (0.047)
F-A -0.021 0.006 -0.028
(0.090) (0.089) (0.063)
A-F-Pre -0.213** -0.170** -0.181***
(0.091) (0.085) (0.060)
A-F-Post -0.217** -0.194** -0.099*
(0.097) (0.088) (0.058)
F-A-Pre 0.018 0.074 -0.047
(0.093) (0.094) (0.059)
F-A-Post 0.076 0.019 0.046
(0.087) (0.069) (0.069)
Observations 958,166 958,166 950,974 958,166 958,166 950,974 958,166 958,166 950,974
Admin-Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Product FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No
Admin-Time FE No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes
Firm-Time FE No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes
Within R2 0.352 0.372 0.322 0.352 0.372 0.322 0.352 0.372 0.322
Notes: This table reports the estimated effect of revolving door movement on procurement prices. The estimated equation is (1). In columns 2, 5, and 8 controls
include previous year administration procurement expenditure and previous year supplier procurement revenue, and the awarding procedure used to allocate the
procurement contract. Robust standard errors clustered at the firm-administration level are in parentheses: *** significant at the 1 percent level, ** significant
at the 5 percent level, * significant at the 10 percent level.
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Table 4: Yearly Amount - Main Results


















Any Revolving 0.109** 0.109** 0.115**
Door (0.051) (0.051) (0.052)
A-F 0.105 0.105 0.103
(0.081) (0.081) (0.083)
F-A 0.153*** 0.153*** 0.161***
(0.056) (0.056) (0.057)
A-F-Pre -0.028 -0.028 -0.024
(0.083) (0.083) (0.084)
A-F-Post 0.156* 0.156* 0.162*
(0.082) (0.082) (0.084)
F-A-Pre 0.267*** 0.267*** 0.271***
(0.063) (0.063) (0.065)
F-A-Post -0.009 -0.010 0.006
(0.066) (0.066) (0.068)
Observations 1,392,057 1,392,057 1,392,057 1,392,057 1,392,057 1,392,057 1,392,057 1,392,057 1,392,057
Admin-Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No
Admin-Time FE No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes
Firm-Time FE No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes
Within R2 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008
Notes: This table reports the estimated effect of revolving door movement on procurement yearly amounts. The estimated equation is (2). In columns 2, 5, and
8 controls include previous year administration procurement expenditure and previous year supplier procurement revenue. Robust standard errors clustered at
the firm-administration level are in parentheses: *** significant at the 1 percent level, ** significant at the 5 percent level, * significant at the 10 percent level.
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Table 5: Test of the Parallel Trend Assumption
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)





Any RD: T-2 -0.1389 -0.119 0.041 0.093 0.093 0.096
(0.109) (0.100) (0.074) (0.061) (0.061) (0.063)
Any RD: T-1 -0.146 -0.130 -0.017 0.042 0.042 0.041
(0.095) (0.093) (0.064) (0.065) (0.065) (0.067)
Any RD: T+1 -0.275*** -0.211* -0.166*** 0.164** 0.164** 0.183**
(0.097) (0.111) (0.051) (0.069) (0.069) (0.073)
Any RD: T+2 -0.158* -0.132 -0.141** 0.131** 0.131** 0.124**
(0.097) (0.097) (0.058) (0.053) (0.053) (0.055)
Observations 761,639 761,639 755,392 1,083,814 1,083,814 1,083,814
Admin-Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Product FE Yes Yes Yes No No No
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls No Yes No No Yes No
Admin-Time FE No No Yes No No Yes
Firm-Time FE No No Yes No No Yes
Within R-squared 0.359 0.380 0.332 0.003 0.003 0.003
Notes: This table reports the estimated effect of revolving door movement on procurement prices and yearly amounts, including
lags and leads. The estimated equation is (1) for prices and (2) for amounts. In columns 2 and 5, controls include previous year
administration procurement expenditure and previous year supplier procurement revenue as well as awarding procedures (for price
only). Robust standard errors clustered at the firm-administration level are in parentheses: *** significant at the 1 percent level,
** significant at the 5 percent level, * significant at the 10 percent level.
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Table 6: Results - Before and After 2005
(1) (2) (3)
Price Price Price
A-F: Before 2005 -0.244** -0.188* -0.163**
(0.105) (0.104) (0.080)
A-F: After 2005 -0.302*** -0.260*** -0.163***
(0.093) (0.082) (0.058)
F-A: Before 2005 -0.139 -0.087 -0.125*
(0.102) (0.107) (0.072)
F-A: After 2005 0.106 0.110 0.067
(0.077) (0.081) (0.058)
Observations 958,166 958,166 950,974
Within R-squared 0.352 0.372 0.323
(4) (5) (6)
Yearly Amount Yearly Amount Yearly Amount
A-F: Before 2005 0.036 0.036 0.032
(0.083) (0.083) (0.085)
A-F: After 2005 0.207** 0.207** 0.211**
(0.102) (0.102) (0.104)
F-A: Before 2005 0.270*** 0.270*** 0.269***
(0.064) (0.064) (0.065)
F-A: After 2005 0.031 0.031 0.044
(0.067) (0.067) (0.069)
Observations 1,392,057 1,392,057 1,392,057
Within R-squared 0.008 0.008 0.008
Admin-Firm FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Controls No Yes No
Admin-Time FE No No Yes
Firm-Time FE No No Yes
Notes: This table reports the estimated effect of revolving door movement on procurement
prices and yearly amounts, before and after 2005. The estimated equation is (1) for prices
and (2) for amounts. In columns 2 and 5, controls include previous year administration
procurement expenditure and previous year supplier procurement revenue as well as award-
ing procedures (for price only). Robust standard errors clustered at the firm-administration
level are in parentheses: *** significant at the 1 percent level, ** significant at the 5 percent
level, * significant at the 10 percent level.
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Table 7: Aggregate Spending Changes from Shutting Down Revolving Door
Panel A - In Million Brazilian Reals of 2000
Admin-to-Firm 771.9
Firm-to-Admin -280.9
Any Revolving Door 491.0
Panel B - In % of total spending (22.1 billion of Brazilian Reals of 2000)
Admin-to-Firm 3.48%
Firm-to-Admin -1.27%
Any Revolving Door 2.21%
Notes: This table reports the estimated effects on aggregate procurement spending of shut-
ting down the revolving doors, by type of revolving door movement (Admin-Firm, Firm-
Admin, and Any Revolving Door). These effects were computed by subtracting S̄ from S,
respectively defined in equation (3) and (4), and using the estimates from Column 3, for
Any Revolving Door, and Column 6, for Admin-Firm and Firm-Admin, of Table S6 in the
Supplementary Material. Panel A shows the changes in aggregate procurement spending in
millions of Brazilian Reals of 2000. Panel B displays those changes in percentage of total
procurement spending from 2000 to 2009, which was 22.1 billion of Brazilian Reals of 2000.
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Supplementary Material: Institutional Background
Public Procurement Legislation. All public bodies in Brazil (national, state and local)
are subject to the 1993 Public Procurement Act (Law 8,666), which delineates procurement
procedures for the acquisition of goods, works and services (i.e., inputs) as well as sale of
government assets. Accordingly, before searching for an input supplier, public bodies have to
come up with a clear description of their needs, including detailed specification of the input,
quantity, quality, place and delivery time. In addition, they have to make all this information
publicly available in an official gazette.
Public bodies usually make purchases in a decentralized way. These are financed by an
annual budget assigned to each public body.38 In the case of health procurement, public hos-
pitals, and health agencies and centers acquire medical supplies, equipment for hospitals, and
pharmaceuticals to be used for inpatient medical treatments, to be distributed gratuitously,
or to be sold to outpatients at subsidized prices in public pharmacies.
For the acquisition of standardized goods and services, such as bandages, medical gloves,
syringes, and off-patent pharmaceuticals, the Procurement Act determines that public bodies
must rely on auction-based mechanisms to award contracts.
Public bodies can use either electronic or physical auctions. The electronic reverse auc-
tions are held over the internet through official procurement platforms, in which any supplier
is allowed to submit a bid.39 Among the physical ones, the legislation has established several
auction mechanisms, going from open competitive bidding to invited bidders. It also estab-
lishes that all procurement of public inputs must be based on value for money, which is a
combination of whole life costs and quality.40
Public bodies choose the award mechanism according to the monetary values involved in
a procurement transaction. High value contracts must be acquired through open competitive
bidding, while those of lower values can be acquired through invited bidding.41 Electronic
38The legislation also allows public bodies to jointly acquire goods and services through pooled procurement
(namely, price registration system). Such arrangements have allowed public entities to attain potential gains
from bulk acquisition that would not be achieved in standard procurement. Barbosa (2015) and Barbosa and
Fiuza (2011) describe the Brazilian pooled procurement system and study its advantages and costs.
39The most commonly used electronic auction formats are first-price sealed-bid auction, English auction,
and two stage auction. There are two other award procedures, which are used for other purposes: Contest and
Standard Open Ascending Price Auction. Contest is used for example to award technical studies, scientific or
art works, while Standard Auction is used for selling public assets.
40Dimitri, Piga and Spagnolo (2006) argue that the value for money awarding rule can be interpreted as
a multi-criteria approach where various dimensions of quality, as well as price, are considered to grant a
procurement contract.
41Public acquisition without competitive bidding is allowed for low value contracts (direct purchase) or
when competition is not possible (inegibility). The terms of the procurement contract awarded through direct
purchase are directly negotiated between the administration and the supplier. Direct Purchase can be used to
award contracts with a value lower than or equal to 8,000 Brazilian Reals, to acquire goods and standardized
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auctions can be used to purchase standardized goods and services of any value.
While in electronic reverse auctions lowest bid is the only criterion for selection of suppliers,
public administrations may use other selection criteria than price-based auction mechanisms
when running physical auctions. For instance, they can base their selection decision on best
technique (precision, safety, and durability, i.e., quality), or best technique and price.
Public Officials’ and Private Workers’ Careers. Public Sector Workers: Selection for
civil servant positions is via competitive examination. Job applicants present academic and
professional credentials, and take a formal civil service examination, which is job-specific and
consists of a combination of written and oral tests. The Brazilian legislation establishes clear
and transparent requirements for the selection of civil servants. They acquire tenure after
three years of service, after which they can only be fired for reasons of misconduct through a
judicial decision.
Public workers can also be hired without passing the civil service examination for two
other categories of public sector positions: appointees (cargos comissionados) and temporary
jobs (empregos temporários). Hiring of appointees is limited to high-level positions (including
directors, managers, supervisors, and advisors). The legislation gives discretion to politicians
to select people for those leadership roles.42 Temporary public servants are hired to meet
temporary and exceptional needs of public administrations, defined by politicians or high-
level public officials. In these cases, no civil service exam is required and the selection process
can be based on the analysis of applicants’ résumés, without other formal objective criteria.
The legislation describes the instances that fall under temporary jobs, and the recruiters can
be prosecuted in case they contract temporary workers without accurate justification.
Private Sector Workers: A worker is formally employed in the Brazilian private labor mar-
ket when he/she signs an official labor contract with an employer, and it is registered in the
worker’s labor record booklet (carteira de trabalho), which records the worker’s entire em-
ployment history in the formal sector. This labor contract implies that the employment is in
compliance with labor taxes and regulations. Formal employment gives the worker access to
benefits that include unemployment insurance and severance payments. Not all labor con-
tracts are formal. When an employer and a worker agree to a labor contract but decide not
to formally sign it and not to include it in the worker’s booklet, the worker’s employment is
services, and 15,000 Brazilian Reals, for complex engineering services and construction. Inegibility can be used
to award contracts for products under patent protection and there is no more than one seller of the product
in the national market. The terms of the procurement contract awarded through inegibility are also directly
negotiated between the administration and the supplier.
42Regular civil servants can be promoted to positions of trust (funções de confiança), which are high-level
public posts with similar status, earning and power as appointees.
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called informal. The main reason for the existence of informal contracts is employer informal-
ity. Although the informal sector amounts to 45% of all employee-employer labor agreements
in Brazil (Amorim and Corseuil, 2016), it is not an important issue when studying the effect
of worker movement between administrations and firms on public procurement outcomes since
only formal firms do business with federal government entities.
The Revolving Door Legislation: Movement of individuals between public administrations
and private organizations in Brazil is regulated by revolving door rules (Provisional Measure
2,216-37/2001, Decree 4,187/2002, Decree 4,405/2002 and Law 12,813/2013), which basically
impose time constraints on the ability of a particular set of high-level public officials to move
from their offices to the private sector. Cabinet ministers, directors of regulatory agencies,
commissioners of the Brazilian Competition Authority (CADE), governors and directors of
the Central Bank of Brazil, and presidents of state-owned companies are prohibited from
working for private organizations during a six-month cooling-off period.43 Noncompliance
with the regulations can bring severe sanctions and penalties, including fines. While the
legislation imposes restrictions on revolving door of high-level public workers, it generally does
not restrict workers’ movements between public administrations (including their procurement
offices) and suppliers. Such lack of restriction allows public officials’ movements to suppliers,
and movements of supplier workers to public administrations.
Supplementary Material: Data Sources and Descriptive Statistics
RAIS Data on Workers’ Occupations and type of Positions. In RAIS, every worker
is assigned an occupation, specific to his/her current job, which is categorized according to
the CBO (Classificação Brasileira de Ocupações). Those occupational categories allow us
to classify workers according to their hierarchical level in public administrations and firms
(directors/managers versus other employees). Additionally, RAIS employment contract detail
data contain for every worker information about hiring and firing reasons and dates, type
of work contract (regular, temporary, short-term, apprenticeship), and more importantly,
information on how a worker was hired in the public sector: as a permanent civil servant or
an appointee.
We are particularly interested in understanding the difference between appointees and civil
servants, to shed light on how different public sector appointment processes and career-related
incentives affect the performance of the procurement process. Civil servants in the Brazilian
43In 2013, Law 12,813 established that high-level appointees are also subject to the same restrictions.
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federal government are hired through a competitive selection process (civil service examina-
tion), for which a large pool of qualified candidates is attracted by the high salaries and job
security offered. This allows the federal government to recruit relatively higher skilled public
officials than other public institutions (but also generates lax job performance due to tenure
rules). Appointees are usually appointed by politicians without any civil service examination,
based either on their competence or on their ability to fulfill politicians’ objectives inside
public administrations. They generally occupy high-level management positions and are paid
more than civil servants.
Directors/managers play important role in public administrations.44 They formulate and
implement organizational strategies that positively impact the performance of their adminis-
trations as a whole (Kelman and Meyers, 2011). In the context of this paper, top managers
are in charge of managing and supervising internal procurement policies. For this reason, we
also look at the effect of directors/managers movements vis-à-vis those of other workers.
Construction of the Revolving Door Dummy Variables. The first dummy variable
Admin − Firm − Prejkt identifies connections through workers’ movements from an admin-
istration to a supplier. At the contracting time t, these workers are still employed by the
administration. It is defined as:
Admin−Firm−Prejkt =

1 if there is at least one individual employed in administration k
at time t who will later work for firm j.
0 otherwise.
The second dummy variable identifies connections through workers’ movements from an
administration to a supplier. At the contracting time t, these workers have already moved to
the firm. This variable, named Admin− Firm− Postjkt, is defined as follows:
Admin−Firm−Postjkt =

1 if there is at least one individual employed in firm j at time t
who has worked for administration k before.
0 otherwise.
The third dummy variable identifies connections through workers’ movement from a firm
to an administration. At the contracting time t, these workers are still employed by the firm.
44The behavior and the role of top managers vis-à-vis middle ones in public administrations, and the man-
agement and leadership techniques associated with the successful achievement of goals, are central questions
in public management. See Kelman (2005), and Brown, Potoski and Van Slyke (2006, 2013) for surveys of
this literature.
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Formally, this variable, named Firm− Admin− Prejkt, is defined as follows:
Firm−Admin−Prejkt =

1 if there is at least one individual employed in firm j at time t
who will later work for administration k
0 otherwise.
Finally, the fourth dummy variable, Firm − Admin − Postjkt, identifies the movement
of an official that worked for a supplier before contracting time t and then moved to an
administration. It is defined as:
Firm−Admin−Postjkt =

1 if there is at least one individual employed in administration k
at time t who has worked for firm j before.
0 otherwise.
Description of the Variables, Structure of the Data, and Descriptive Statistics.
Table S1 lists the variables used in the paper, their description and sources.
Table S2 details the structure of the data, describing the period that each of our datasets
covers, the number of procurement transactions, products, suppliers, administrations, as well
as the number of workers that have worked for the suppliers or administrations in our dataset
during the period of analysis.
Table S3 contains descriptive statistics of some of the key procurement outcomes that we
investigate in this paper: yearly amount of contracts, acquisition price, volume (contract size),
and contract value in Panel A; award procedures in Panel B, and other procurement variables
in Panel C. As can be seen there, around 30% of our observations are electronic auctions and
close to 45% are direct purchases.45
45The paper by Ferraz, Finan and Szerman (2016) documents the effect of winning procurement contracts in
electronic auctions on Brazilian firms’ growth. Note that our paper relies on a larger set of award mechanisms,
as electronic auctions represent less than one-third of our sample.
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Table S1: Variables and Sources
Variable Description Source
Panel A - Procurement Variables
Procurement Outcomes:
Yearly Amount of Contracts
It corresponds to the total amount of contracts of health products (pre-
scription drugs, medical supplies, hospital equipments and services) per




Price paid by an administration to a firm for a specific/standardized product
in a given procurement contract, in Brazilian Reals of 2000. Health prod-
ucts (prescription drugs, medical supplies, hospital equipments and services)
procured by the federal government bodies are standardized and codified by
the Ministry of Health.
DW
Volume (Q)
Quantity purchased by an administration from a firm for a spe-




Total amount paid by an administration to a firm for a certain number of
a specific/standardized product units in a given procurement contract. It
corresponds to Price (P) multiplied by Volume (Q), in Brazilian Reals of




Dummy variable equal to one if direct purchase (dispensa de licitação) is
the method used to award the procurement contract, and zero, otherwise.
The terms of the procurement contract awarded through direct purchase
are directly negotiated between the administration and the supplier. No
tender is needed to select the supplier. Direct Purchase can be used to
award contracts with a value lower than or equal to 8,000 Brazilian Reals,
to acquire goods and standardized services, and 15,000 Brazilian Reals, for
complex engineering services and construction.
DW
Inegibilities
Dummy variable equal to one if inegibilities (inegixibilidade) is the method
used to award the procurement contract, and zero, otherwise. The terms of
the procurement contract awarded through inegibilities are directly negoti-
ated between the administration and the supplier. No tender is needed to
select the supplier. Inegibilities can be used to award contracts for products
under patent protection and there is no more than one seller of the product
in the national market.
DW
Open Auction
Dummy variable equal to one if open auction (concorrência) is the method
used to award the procurement contract, and zero, otherwise. In open
auctions any firm can participate in the tender, and the winner is selected
through first-price sealed-bid auction. An Open Auction must be used to
award contracts with a value higher than or equal to 650,000 Brazilian Reals,
to acquire goods and standardized services, and 1,500,000 Brazilian Reals,
for complex engineering services and construction.
DW
International Open Auction
Dummy variable equal to one if international open auction (concorrência
internacional) is the method used to award the procurement contract, and
zero, otherwise. The rules that guide this procedure are similar to the ones
that governs open auctions. The only difference between open auction and
international open auction is that under the latter international bidders can
submit their offer for a procurement contract without having their compa-
nies registered with the national tax authority.
DW
Continue on the next page.S7
Table S1: Variables and Sources (continued)
Variable Description Source
Open Score Auction
Dummy variable equal to one if open score auction (concorrência com téc-
nica e preço) is the method used to award the procurement contract, and
zero, otherwise. In open score auctions any firm can participate in the ten-
der, and bidders submit a price and a technical proposal. Based on the
rules of the tender, price and technical proposals gets different weights to
compose the final score of each bidder. Bidder achieving the highest total
score wins the contract. A Open Score Auction must be used to award
contracts with a value higher than or equal to 650,000 Brazilian Reals, to
acquire goods and standardized services, and 1,500,000 Brazilian Reals, for
complex engineering services and construction, when quality of the technical
proposal is a relevant dimension of the project.
DW
Invited Bidding
Dummy variable equal to one if invited bidding (convite) is the method used
to award the procurement contract, and zero, otherwise. In invited bidding
auctions only firms invited to participant in a tender can submit a bid, and
the winner is selected through first-price sealed-bid auction. A minimum
of 3 bidders is required to start a tender. Invited bidding can be used to
award contracts with a value lower than or equal to 80,000 Brazilian Reals,
to acquire goods and standardized services, and 150,000 Brazilian Reals, for
complex engineering services and construction.
DW
Electronic Auction
Dummy variable equal to one if electronic auction (pregão eletrônico) is the
method used to award the procurement contract, and zero, otherwise. In
electronic auctions any firm can submit their bids electronically through the
Brazilian eProcurement Platform (Compras Net), and the selection of the
winner is based on an auction-based mechanism. The bidder that offers the
lowest price wins the contract. Electronic auction can be used to acquire
goods and standardized services of any value.
DW
Two Stage Auction
Dummy variable equal to one if two stage auction (pregão presencial) is the
method used to award the procurement contract, and zero, otherwise. In
two stage auctions any firm can participate in the tender, and the winner is
selected through a two stage auction mechanism. The bidder that offers the
lowest price wins the contract. Two stage auction can be used to acquire
goods and standardized services of any value.
DW
Restricted Bidding
Dummy variable equal to one if restricted bidding (tomada de preço) is the
method used to award the procurement contract, and zero, otherwise. In
restricted bidding auctions only firms invited to participate in a tender can
submit a bid, and the winner is selected through first-price sealed-bid auc-
tion. A minimum of 3 bidders is required to start a tender. Restricted
bidding can be used to award contracts with a value lower than or equal
to 650,000 Brazilian Reals, to acquire goods and standardized services, and




Dummy variable equal to one if Price Registration System (registro de preço)
is the method used to award the procurement contract, and zero, otherwise.
Price registration system can be used to acquire goods and standardized





Total amount of contracts of health products (prescription drugs, medical
supplies, hospital equipments and services) awarded by an administration
in a given year, in Brazilian Reals of 2000 (divided by 100).
DW
Continue on the next page.
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Total amount of contracts of health products (prescription drugs, medical
supplies, hospital equipments and services) supplied by a firm to federal
administrations in a given year, in Brazilian Reals of 2000 (divided by 100).
DW
Panel B - Labor Market Variables
Appointee Dummy variable equal to one if the worker of a public administration is anappointee as described in Section 3, and zero, otherwise. R
Civil Servant Dummy variable equal to one if the worker of a public administration is aregular civil servant as described in Section 3, and zero, otherwise. R
Other Workers
Dummy variable equal to one if the worker of a public administration is
neither a civil servant nor an appointee, and zero, otherwise. Temporary




Dummy variable equal to one if the worker of a public administration is
classified, according to the CBO (Classficação Brasileira de Ocupações),




Dummy variable equal to one if the worker of a public administration is not
classified as a director/manager of the institution that he/she works for,
and zero, otherwise.
R
Panel C - Revolving Door Variables
Any Revolving Door Dummy variable equal to one if at least one of the dummy variables Admin-Firm or Firm-Admin are equal to one, and zero, otherwise. M
Admin-Firm Dummy variable equal to one if at least one of the dummy variables Admin-Firm-Past or Admin-Firm-Future are equal to one, and zero, otherwise. M
Admin-Firm-Pre
Dummy variable equal to one for all procurement contracts of a firm-
administration pair jk at time t, where administration k employs an in-
dividual at time t who will work for firm j after time t. Otherwise, this
variable is equal to zero.
M
Admin-Firm-Post
Dummy variable equal to one for all procurement contracts of a firm-
administration pair jk at time t, where adminstration k has employed an
individual before time t who works for firm j at time t. Otherwise, this
variable is equal to zero.
M
Firm-Admin Dummy variable equal to one if at least one of the dummy variables Firm-Admin-Past or Firm-Admin-Future are equal to one, and zero, otherwise. M
Firm-Admin-Pre
Dummy variable equal to one for all procurement contracts of a firm-
administration pair jk at time t, where firm j employs an individual at
time t who will work for administration k after time t. Otherwise, this
variable is equal to zero.
M
Firm-Admin-Post
Dummy variable equal to one for all procurement contracts of a firm-
administration pair jk at time t, where firm j employed an individual before
time t who works for adminstration k at time t. Otherwise, this variable is
equal to zero.
M
This table lists the variables used in the paper, their description and sources. Data sources: DW=ComprasNet’s Data
Warehouse, R=RAIS, M=Merger of RAIS and ComprasNet’s Data Warehouse.
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Table S2: Descriptive Statistics - Procurement Transactions and Workers
Panel A - Data Sets
Data Set Period
Procurement Data (DW ComprasNet) 2000-2009
Worker’s Data (RAIS) 1998-2009
Panel B - Characteristics: Procurement and Workers’ Data
Variable Number of Observations
Procurement Transactions 2 299 786
Products 1 942 210
Firms 50 481
Administrations 977
Firm-Administration pairs 154 673
Workers 10 050 913
Notes: This table details the structure of the data that we use in the paper. Panel A presents the different
data sources that we put together to construct our final data set, and describes the period that each of
our data sets covers. Panel B provides information on the number of procurement transactions, prod-
ucts, firms (suppliers), administrations (buyers), firm-administration pairs, and the number of individual
(workers) that have worked for the firms or administrations in our data during the period of analysis.
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Table S3: Descriptive Statistics - Procurement Outcomes and Characteristics
Panel A - Procurement Outcomes
Obs Mean St.Dev. Min Max
Yearly Amount of Contracts 216 698 3 432 995 401 0 463 000 000
Price (P) 2 299 786 6 637 7 637 249 0 11 600 000 000
Volume (Q) 2 299 786 4 596 749 157 1 1 000 000 000
Contract Value (PQ) 2 299 786 108.71 76 406.06 0.00 116 000 000
Panel B - Awarding Procedure
Obs Mean St.Dev. Min Max
Direct Purchase 2 299 786 0.4419 0.4966 0 1
Inegibilities 2 299 786 0.0159 0.1249 0 1
Open Auction 2 299 786 0.0410 0.1983 0 1
International Open Auction 2 299 786 0.0003 0.0179 0 1
Open Score Auction 2 299 786 0.0000 0.0009 0 1
Invited Bidding 2 299 786 0.1325 0.3390 0 1
Electronic Auction 2 299 786 0.2913 0.4544 0 1
Two Stage Auction 2 299 786 0.0228 0.1494 0 1
Restricted Bidding 2 299 786 0.0542 0.2265 0 1
Price Registration System 2 299 786 0.1697 0.3754 0 1
Panel C - Other Variables
Obs Mean St.Dev. Min Max
Yearly Administration
Procurement Expenditure 7 784 43 297 1 387 272 0.0029 118 000 000
Yearly Supplier
Procurement Revenue 106 657 3 159.89 355 909 0.0000 116 000 000
Notes: This table reports summary statistics of the variables used in the paper. Panel A contains descriptive
statistics on the procurement outcomes that we investigate in the paper: yearly amount of contract per firm-
administration pair, acquisition price (price), volume (contract size), contract value. Panel B reports the fraction of
each awarding procedure used to allocate the procurement contracts in our data. Panel C shows summary statistics
for yearly procurement expenditure per administration and yearly federal procurement revenue per supplier. Price
is in Brazilian Reals of 2000. Yearly amount of contracts, Contract value, yearly administration procurement
expenditure and yearly supplier procurement revenue are in Brazilian Reals of 2000 (divided by 100). Volume is
in units of the standardized product. All variables were constructed as described in Table S1.
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Supplementary Material: Figures and Tables
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F-A
Amount
Revolving Doors by Types of Worker's Contract
Notes: This figure displays the estimated impact of revolving door movements (Admin-Firm, A-F; and Firm-
Admin; F-A) on procurement prices and yearly amounts, by workers type, and their respective 95% confidence
intervals. These estimations correspond to estimated effects reported in Column 3, for prices, and Column 6,
for amounts, of Table S5.
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Table S4: Yearly Amount - Intensive Margin



















Any Revolving 0.187 0.199 0.101
Door (0.166) (0.164) (0.141)
A-F 0.193 0.244 0.164
(0.271) (0.270) (0.231)
F-A 0.105 0.103 0.021
(0.151) (0.150) (0.128)
A-F-Pre -0.041 0.010 -0.030
(0.306) (0.302) (0.270)
A-F-Post 0.533** 0.555** 0.395*
(0.272) (0.272) (0.238)
F-A-Pre 0.028 0.033 -0.004
(0.170) (0.164) (0.144)
F-A-Post 0.303** 0.293* 0.102
(0.171) (0.168) (0.142)
Observations 156,325 156,325 142,433 156,325 156,325 142,433 156,325 156,325 142,433
Admin-Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No
Admin-Time FE No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes
Firm-Time FE No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes
Within R2 0.006 0.008 0.009 0.006 0.008 0.009 0.006 0.009 0.009
Notes: This table reports the estimated effect of revolving door movement on procurement yearly amounts. The estimated equation follows the same specification
in equation (2). In columns 2, 5, and 8 controls include previous year administration procurement expenditure and previous year supplier procurement revenue.
Robust standard errors clustered at the firm-administration level are in parentheses: *** significant at the 1 percent level, ** significant at the 5 percent level,
* significant at the 10 percent level.
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Table S5: Results by Types of Workers
(1) (2) (3)
Price Price Price
A-F: Civil Servant -0.299*** -0.242*** -0.180***
(0.072) (0.067) (0.048)
A-F: Appointee -0.010 0.043 0.278
(0.427) (0.421) (0.249)
A-F: Temporary -0.226*** -0.292*** -0.065
(0.087) (0.106) (0.135)
F-A: Civil Servant 0.053 0.066 0.009
(0.081) (0.088) (0.068)
F-A: Appointee -0.674*** -0.523*** -0.3764***
(0.194) (0.167) (0.103)
F-A: Temporary 0.111 0.094 0.066
(0.203) (0.215) (0.162)
Observations 958,166 958,166 950,974
Within R-squared 0.352 0.372 0.323
(4) (5) (6)
Yearly Amount Yearly Amount Yearly Amount
A-F: Civil Servant 0.079 0.079 0.077
(0.092) (0.092) (0.093)
A-F: Appointee 0.339 0.339 0.338
(0.266) (0.266) (0.271)
A-F: Temporary 0.147 0.146 0.147
(0.112) (0.112) (0.115)
F-A: Civil Servant 0.162*** 0.162*** 0.171***
(0.060) (0.060) (0.062)
F-A: Appointee 0.133 0.133 0.133
(0.158) (0.158) (0.162)
F-A: Temporary 0.245 0.245 0.250
(0.179) (0.179) (0.183)
Observations 1,392,057 1,392,057 1,392,057
Within R-squared 0.008 0.008 0.008
Admin-Firm FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Controls No Yes No
Admin-Time FE No No Yes
Firm-Time FE No No Yes
Notes: This table reports the estimated effect of revolving door movement
by workers type on procurement prices and yearly amounts. The estimated
equation is (1) for prices and (2) for amounts. In columns 2 and 5, controls
include previous year administration procurement expenditure and previous
year supplier procurement revenue as well as awarding procedures (for price
only). Robust standard errors clustered at the firm-administration level are
in parentheses: *** significant at the 1 percent level, ** significant at the 5
percent level, * significant at the 10 percent level.
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Table S6: Contract Value


















Any Revolving -0.063 -0.037 -0.073
Door (0.141) (0.121) (0.089)
A-F -0.420*** -0.296*** -0.332***
(0.096) (0.076) (0.076)
F-A 0.223 0.194 0.159
(0.147) (0.135) (0.098)
A-F-Pre -0.359*** -0.238*** -0.327***
(0.108) (0.090) (0.087)
A-F-Post -0.3168*** -0.2524** -0.236**
(0.122) (0.101) (0.093)
F-A-Pre 0.187** 0.2502** 0.067
(0.092) (0.105) (0.072)
F-A-Post 0.285* 0.108 0.217*
(0.148) (0.093) (0.114)
Observations 958,166 958,166 950,974 958,166 958,166 950,974 958,166 958,166 950,974
Admin-Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Product FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No
Admin-Time FE No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes
Firm-Time FE No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes
Within R2 0.002 0.063 0.002 0.002 0.064 0.002 0.002 0.064 0.002
Notes: This table reports the estimated effect of revolving door movement on procurement contract value (price x quantity). The estimated equation follows
the same specification in equation (1). In columns 2, 5, and 8 controls include previous year administration procurement expenditure and previous year supplier
procurement revenue, and the awarding procedure used to allocate the procurement contract. Robust standard errors clustered at the firm-administration level
are in parentheses: *** significant at the 1 percent level, ** significant at the 5 percent level, * significant at the 10 percent level.
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A-F-Pre Spillover -0.006 -0.005 0.002
(0.014) (0.014) (0.012)
Observations 958,166 958,166 950,974
Within R-squared 0.352 0.372 0.323
Spillover By Types of Workers
(4) (5) (6)
Price Price Price
A-F-Pre Spillover: Civil Servant -0.008 -0.015 0.002
(0.016) (0.016) (0.013)
A-F-Pre Spillover: Appointee -0.006 -0.003 0.004
(0.045) (0.042) (0.037)
A-F-Pre Spillover: Temporary -0.002 -0.049 0.021
(0.038) (0.036) (0.032)
Observations 958,166 958,166 950,974
Within R-squared 0.3530 0.373 0.323
Spillover By Worker’s Hierarchy
(7) (8) (9)
Price Price Price
A-F-Pre Spillover: Directors -0.108*** -0.052* -0.059**
(0.031) (0.030) (0.027)
A-F-Pre Spillover: Non-Directors 0.004 -0.001 0.010
(0.015) (0.015) (0.013)
Observations 958,166 958,166 950,974
Within R-squared 0.353 0.373 0.323
Admin-Firm FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Controls No Yes No
Admin-Time FE No No Yes
Firm-Time FE No No Yes
Notes: This table reports the spillover estimated effect of A-F-Pre revolving
door movement (when an employee is currently working for the administration
and will move to the firm later on) on the price at which the administration buys
from other firms. The estimated equation is (1). In columns 2, 5 and 8, controls
include previous year administration procurement expenditure and previous
year supplier procurement revenue as well as awarding procedures. Robust
standard errors clustered at the firm-administration level are in parentheses:
*** significant at the 1 percent level, ** significant at the 5 percent level, *
significant at the 10 percent level.
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Table S8: Awarding Procedures
(1) (2) (3)
Variables Direct Purchase Invited Bidding Open AuctionMechanisms
A-F-Pre 0.123 -0.040 -0.018
(0.081) (0.050) (0.017)
A-F-Post 0.120 -0.017 -0.008
(0.074) (0.054) (0.017)
F-A-Pre 0.031 -0.003 -0.008
(0.032) (0.015) (0.056)
F-A-Post -0.078 -0.012 -0.045
(0.073) (0.029) (0.055)
Observations 950,974 950,974 950,974
Admin-Firm FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Controls No No No
Admin-Time FE Yes Yes Yes
Firm-Time FE Yes Yes Yes
Within R2 0.011 0.007 0.007
Notes: This table reports the estimated effect of revolving door on the likelihood of
Direct Purchase, Invited Bidding and Open Auction Mechanisms being the awarding
procedure for a public procurement contract. A linear probability model following the
specification in equation (1) is estimated. Column 1 shows the effect of revolving doors
on the probability of Direct Purchase, and column 2 on Invited Bidding. Column 3
reports the revolving doors effect on the probability of Open Auction Mechanisms.
Open Auctions, International Open Auctions, Open Score Auctions, Electronic Auc-
tions and Two Stage Auctions are Open Auction Mechanisms. Detailed information
on the different awarding procedure can be found in Table S1. Robust standard errors
clustered at the firm-administration level are in parentheses: *** significant at the 1
percent level, ** significant at the 5 percent level, * significant at the 10 percent level.
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Supplementary Material: Estimation Method
Estimation of effect of revolving door movements on procurement contract out-
comes. Equation (1) in the paper estimates the effects officials’ movement from public to
private (and the reserve) on procurement prices (and on contract value, in Section 7, Table
S6). Due to the large number of firms (50,481), administrations (977), firm-administration
pairs (154,673) and products (1,942,210) in the our data set, the usual statistical softwares
(e.g., STATA) cannot estimate equation (1).
In order to make the estimation of equation (1) possible, we transform the original variables
into deviations from firm-administration means. From there, we can derive an econometric
specification that can be estimated using STATA.
To show how we implement the econometric transformation, consider the estimated equa-
tion (1) below:
ln pljkt = αl + κt + τjk +RD′jktβ + γqljkt + δjt + ηkt + uljkt. (S1)
Now, consider the between firm-administration regression model of equation (S1):
ln pjk = αl + κt + τ jk +RD
′






































































αl = α∗; κt = κ∗; τ jk = τjk; δj = δ∗; ηk = η∗.
Replacing them in equation (S2), we can write the between firm-administration regression
S18
as follows:
ln pjk = α∗ + κ∗ + τjk +RD
′
jkβ + γqjk + δ∗ + η∗ + ujk. (S3)
Now consider the deviations from firm-administration means model, which can be derived
by taking the difference between (S1) and (S3):




This econometric specification can be estimated using STATA because the firm, adminis-
tration, and firm-administration pair fixed effects were removed from the estimated equation
(S4).
Estimation of effect of revolving door movements on yearly amount of contracts.
Similarly, to estimate equation (2), we proceed as in the previous section, transforming the
original variables into deviations from firm-administration means. The transformation is not
identical to the previous one, since we now use the yearly amount of contracts data.
In order to make the estimation of equation (2) possible, we have to transform the origi-
nal variables into deviations from firm-administration means. From there, we can derive an
econometric specification that can be estimated using STATA.
To show how we implement the econometric transformation, consider the following linear
probability model for equation (2) that can be estimated as follows:
ln yjkt = κt + τjk +RD′jktβ + δjt + ηkt + νjkt, (S5)
Now, consider the between firm-administration regression model:
ln yjk = κt + τ jk +RD
′
jkβ + δj + ηk + νjk, (S6)
where
ln yjk = T−1
T∑
t=1







κt; τ jk = T−1
T∑
t=1













κt = κ∗; τ jk = τjk; δj = δ∗; ηk = η∗.
Replacing them in equation (S6), we can write the between firm-administration regression
as follows:
ln yjk = κ∗ + τjk +RD
′
jkβ + δ∗ + η∗ + νjk. (S7)
Now consider the deviations from firm-administration means model, which can be derived
by taking the difference between (S5) and (S7):
(ln yjkt − ln yjk) = (κt − κ∗) + (RD′jkt −RD
′
jk)β + (δjt − δ∗) + (ηkt − η∗) + (νjkt − νjk). (S8)
This econometric specification can be estimated using STATA because the firm, administra-
tion, and firm-administration pair fixed effects were removed from the estimated equation
(S8).
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Supplementary Material: Value for Revolving Door Workers
We have argued that revolving door workers exploit their advantage to move across sectors
and secure a position with a counterpart entity in the public or private sector. In this section,
we show that these movements generate substantial wage bonuses, but also that these gains
are quite heterogeneous across categories of workers.
We follow the seminal approach of Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis (1999), and use the RAIS
worker-firm longitudinal data to generate an additive decomposition of observed workers’
wages, in terms of a worker fixed effect, an employer fixed effect, and worker-level time-
varying controls. Controls include age, length of tenure and education level. Formally, we
estimate:
yijt = θi + ξj +X ′itβ + νijt, (S9)
where yijt is the wage of worker i in employer j at time t, θi is a worker fixed effect, ξj is an
employer fixed effect, Xit is a vector of time variant observable characteristics of workers, and
νijt is the error term, which is assumed to be uncorrelated with other regressors on the right
hand side.
We then retrieve workers’ fixed effects and analyze to what extent they are explained by
revolving door dummies versus workers’ unobservable attributes. In addition, we look at the
heterogeneity of these results, by interacting revolving door dummies with the employment
contract type at the time of the movement.
The follow-up estimating equation is given by:
θ̂i = u′iγ + αi, (S10)
where θ̂i is the predicted worker i fixed effect from (S9), ui is a vector of revolving door
dummies and their interactions with worker characteristics, and αi captures the unobserved
component of worker i fixed effect.
The results from equation (S9) are in the upper panel of Table S9. Column 1 includes
linear controls, while Column 2 includes higher order terms for age and tenure (up to cubic
and quadratic terms respectively), following Card, Heining and Kline (2013).
As expected, workers’ wages are significantly increasing in education, age, and length of
tenure. When worker, employer, time, occupation, and type of employment contract fixed
effects are included, these specifications explain over 90% of the variance in wages.46
The lower panel of Table S9 then presents the results from estimating equation (S10) on a
46Simpler specifications omitting occupation and type of contract fixed effects yield almost identical results
for both (S9) and (S10).
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set of 7.8 million workers for whom there is enough time variation, based on the worker fixed
effects estimated with (S9). As is apparent, revolving door workers earn a significant premium,
corresponding to 20.5% of the average sample wage for workers moving from the public to the
private sector, and 31.1% for workers going from the private to the public sector.47
Finally, Table S10 summarizes results regarding the premium heterogeneity along workers’
characteristics, based on regressing the fixed effects from the basic specification without higher
order terms (Column 1, Table S9) on revolving door dummies and their interactions with the
type of public positions held.
Looking at the categories of employment reveals significant differences.48 The post-public
employment wage premium is roughly similar for appointees and directors, equal to around
half the average sample wage, and roughly three times larger than that of regular civil servants.
The difference is larger for post-private employment type of revolving door workers, where
the premium for directors is now approximately equal to 100% of the average sample wage,
double that of appointees and triple that of civil servants. Clearly, high-level directors going
into the public sector after a career in the private sector are in a separate class when it comes
to premium.
Note finally that although it is known from the literature (e.g., Finan, Olken and Pande,
2015) that public sector positions have significant additional benefits, such as better health
insurance, pensions and potential job stability, our premium measure does not take these into
account. It also does not incorporate other potential unobserved sources of benefits from
revolving doors, such as shares in private firms’ capital or bribes.
47The average sample wage corresponds to R$ 1,450 at 2000 value.
48The values are computed assuming an age equal to the sample average (36). Each additional year of age
at the time of movement adds a 2% to the premium.
S22
Table S9: AKM Estimates for Revolving Door Workers
Panel A - Worker’s Wage Decomposition
Wage Wage
1 2
Elementary School (Dummy) -53.1886*** -52.6660***
(0.7529) (0.7512)
High School (Dummy) -41.1711*** -41.8097***
(0.6341) (0.6326)




Age (2nd power) 0.6678***
(0.0062)
Age (3rd power) -0.0079***
(0.0001)
Tenure in Office 6.9515*** 13.3588***
(0.0370) (0.0921)
Tenure in Office (2nd power) -1.4175***
(0.0083)
Tenure in Office (3rd power) 0.0597***
(0.0003)
Tenure in Office (4th power) -0.0005***
(0.0000)
Worker F.E. Yes Yes
Employer F.E. Yes Yes
Time F.E. (Year) Yes Yes
Occupation F.E. Yes Yes
Employment Contract F.E. Yes Yes
R-Square 0.9082 0.9086
Obs 51 718 148 51 718 148
Panel B - RD Worker and Worker’s Wage Fixed Effect
Worker FE Worker FE
1 2
Admin-Firm RD Worker 228.6694*** 238.7237***
(17.9235) (17.5640)
Firm-Admin RD Worker 346.7487*** 348.6128***
(15.0566) (14.7547)
Obs 7 825 407 7 825 407
Notes: This table reports the results from workers’ wage decomposition. Panel A
shows the results from the wage decomposition in terms workers’ fixed effects, age,
length of tenure (tenure in office), and education level, following equation (S9). In
all columns of Panel A the dependent variable is workers’ wage. In all regressions
we include worker, employer, occupation, employment contract type and year fixed
effects. Panel B reports the effects of Admin-Firm revolving door and Firm-Admin
revolving door dummies on predicted workers’ fixed effects from equation (S9), fol-
lowing the specification in equation (S10). Robust standard errors clustered at the
worker level are in parentheses: *** significant at the 1 percent level, ** significant
at the 5 percent level, * significant at the 10 percent level.
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Table S10: Workers’ Revolving Door Bonuses by Categories
Admin-to-Firm RD workers Firm-to Admin RD workers
Civil Servants 197.3*** 316.3***
Appointees 610.0*** 586.8***
Directors 505.4*** 1114.3***
Notes: This table reports the estimated variation of wage premium according to work-
ers’ characteristics at the time of the movement. Those wage premiums are estimated
by regressing the workers’ fixed effect from the specification in Column 1, Table S9,
on revolving door dummies and their interactions with type of public positions held.
Robust standard errors are in parentheses: *** significant at the 1 percent level, **
significant at the 5 percent level, * significant at the 10 percent level.
S24
References
Abowd, J., Kramarz, F., and Margolis, D., 1999. “High-Wage Workers and High-Wage
Firms.” Econometrica, 67 (2), 251-333.
Amorim, B., and Corseuil, C., 2016. “Analysis of the Dynamics of the Sectoral Employment
from 2014 to 2015.” N.T. 23/2016, IPEA Working Paper Series, Rio de Janeiro, IPEA,
2015 [In Portuguese].
Barbosa, K., and Fiuza, E., 2011. “Demand Aggregation and Credit Risk Effects in Pooled
Procurement: Evidence from the Brazilian Public Purchases of Pharmaceuticals and
Medical Supplies.” FGV-EESP C-Micro Working Paper Series.
Barbosa, K. 2015. “The Brazilian Procurement System of Price Registration”, In Aper-
feiçoando a Qualidade Regulatória, Eduardo Fiuza and Lucia Helena Salgado, editors,
Rio de Janeiro, IPEA, 2015 [In Portuguese].
Brown, T., Potoski, M., and Slyke, D., 2006. “Managing Public Service Contracts: Aligning
Values, Institutions, and Markets.” Public Administration Review, 66(3), 323-331.
Brown, T., Potoski, M., and Slyke, D., 2013. Complex Contracting: Government Purchasing
in the Wake of the US Coast Guard’s Deepwater Program. Cambridge University Press.
Card, D., Heining, J., and Kline, P., 2013. “Workplace Heterogeneity and the Rise of West
German Wage Inequality.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 128, 967-1015.
Dimitri, N., Piga, G., and Spagnolo, G., 2006. Handbook of Procurement, Cambridge (UK):
Cambridge U.P., Cambridge (UK).
Ferraz, C., Finan, F., and Szerman, D., 2016. “Procuring Firm Growth: The Effects of
Government Purchases on Firm Dynamics”, Mimeo.
Kelman, S., and Meyers, J., 2011. “Successfully Achieving Ambitious Goals in Government:
An Empirical Analysis.” American Review of Public Administration, 41(3), 235-262.
Kelman, S., 2005. Unleashing Change: A Study Of Organizational Renewal In Government.
Brookings Institution Press.
S25
